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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ) 
GARY KEVIN BRENSIKE, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
DC No: 971021579 FS 
CP No: 981691-CA 
Priority No: 2 
OPENING BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (Supp. 1998), and pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) 
(1998). 
II• ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the Appellant/Defendant's ("Defendant") Sixth 
Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. All alleged 
violations will be advanced in separate subcategories within his 
first argument. 
1. Standard of Review 
When a "claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is raised for 
the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it 
presents a question of law." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 
(Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 
(Utah App. 1992)) . 
B. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion 
for Mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor inquired into 
Defendant's in-custody status during the trial? 
1. Standard of Review 
"The standard of review for ruling on motions for mistrial 
due to prosecutorial misconduct is abuse of discretion." State 
v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997). 
C. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit 
Defendant's proposed reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction to the jury? 
1. Standard of Review 
"'Whether [a] trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury 
instruction constitutes error is a question of law, [and is] 
review[ed] for correctness.'" State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1231 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 
(Utah 1992)) (brackets inserted). 
This issue was submitted in Defendant's Docketing Statement. 
After reviewing the Record, see Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 297, lines 
11-25, and id. at 298, lines 1-19, the Defendant now withdraws 
this issue. The facts and case law support the conclusion that 
the trial court did not err in refusing to submit Defendant's 
requested reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction to the 
jury. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1233 ("[W]e have clearly held 
that no such reasonable alternative [hypothesis instruction] be 
mentioned where, as here, the jury is instructed that the State 
must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.") 
(citing State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985) (citing 
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985))). Accord: State 
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v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 799 (Utah 1991); State v. Burton, 642 
P.2d 716, 719 (Utah 1982). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. U.S. Const., Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
2. Utah Const., Article I § 7 and Article I § 12. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
After trial by jury in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. 
Henriod presiding, the Defendant was convicted of Forgery, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(Supp. 1998), and attempted Theft by Deception, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (Supp. 
1998). This appeals follows. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 2nd, 1997, the Defendant rented a U-Haul truck 
("truck") to move some possessions. Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 24 0, 
lines 1-5. Lawrence Novak ("Mr. Novak") was going to help. Id. 
at lines 8-24. Around 9:00 a.m., on that day, the Defendant 
picked Mr. Novak up in Draper, Utah. Id. at 241, lines 1-14. 
They then departed to the residence of some friends Mr. Novak 
knew in Sandy, Utah, which was close to a Wal-Mart store. Id. at 
243, lines 3-18. 
After they arrived, around 9:30 a.m., Mr. Novak told the 
Defendant he wanted to take the truck to go and get something to 
eat; the Defendant said, okay. Id. at 244, lines 7-17. The 
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Defendant did not have contact with Mr. Novak again until 
approximately 12:00 p.m. Id. at 22-25. Prior to seeing Mr. 
Novak again, the Defendant asked Mr. Novak's friends to give him 
a ride; they agreed and took him. Id. at 245, lines 13-17. The 
Defendant located the truck in the Wal-Mart parking lot; it was 
locked so he went looking for Mr. Novak. Id. at lines 18-21. He 
first went to some food establishments, then to Wal-Mart. Id. at 
lines 22-25; see id. at 246, line 1. 
Once inside Wal-Mart, the Defendant went to the electronics 
section. Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 246, lines 5-6. After some 
disturbance inside the store caused by the Defendant, the 
Defendant left the store and returned to the residence. Id. at 
251, lines 4-15. When he got there, Mr. Novak was there; the 
Defendant got the keys to the truck from him. Id. at lines 16-
25; see id. at 252, lines 1-2. Mr. Novak told the Defendant the 
reason he had not returned sooner was because the truck had 
broken down; he also told the Defendant he was down by Wal-Mart. 
Id. at lines 5-7; id. at 245, lines 1-4. The Defendant then 
asked Mr. Novak's friends for a ride, however, they declined, 
saying they did not want to get involved; they did give him a 
bike and a sweatshirt. Id. at 252, lines 4-10. 
Thereafter, the Defendant went to the truck, located in the 
Wal-Mart lot, placed the bike in the back of the truck, and left. 
Id. at lines 11-16. He was later pulled over, asked to exit the 
vehicle and told to put his hands behind his back. Id. at lines 
17-24. While cuffed and on the ground, an officer asked someone 
4 
if they could identify the Defendant. Id. at 253, lines 6-13. 
Identification was by Shane Rowley. Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 163. 
The Defendant was then transported to the Sandy City Police 
Department, and questioned. Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 253, lines 
18-24. Prior to interrogating the Defendant, Sandy City Police 
Detective Hal Cutler ("Det. Cutler") informed him of his rights 
per Miranda.1 Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 228, lines 23-24. See also 
Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 196, lines 3-4; id. at 201, lines 12-14. 
While Det. Cutler was interrogating the Defendant, he invoked his 
Miranda right to counsel. See Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 225, lines 
5-25; id. at 226, lines 1-4. See also Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 
260, lines 14-23, and id. at 261, lines 1-4. 
During the course of the trial, the jury's attention was 
directed seven times to the fact that during his post-arrest 
interview with the officers, the Defendant invoked his Miranda 
right to counsel. The prosecution first attracted the jury's 
attention to this fact. See Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 225, lines 5-
25; id. at 226, line 1-4. Then, trial counsel had the Defendant 
remark about it the next three times. Tr. Trans, Vol. II at 260, 
17-23; id. at 261, lines 2-4. The last three times, the 
prosecutor again directed the jurors attention to the fact the 
Defendant invoked his Miranda right to counsel. See Tr. Trans., 
Vol. II at 284, lines 17-19; id. at 285, lines 14-16; see id. at 
lines 22-24. 
1
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5 
In addition to the foregoing, during the course of the 
trial, the prosecutor, numerous times, also focused the jury's 
attention to the fact the Defendant was incarcerated in June of 
1997, just slightly before trial, even though there was a pre-
trial order he not mention the Defendant's character. See Tr. 
Trans., Vol. II at 301, lines 22-35. Trial counsel did not make 
a contemporaneous objection, however, she stated her objection at 
the conclusion of the trial. Based on her objection, trial 
counsel moved for a mistrial. Id. at 299, lines 1-25, and id. at 
300, lines 1-21. The trial court denied the motion. Id. at 301, 
lines 22-25; id. at 302, lines 1-19. 
Finally, during the trial, the prosecutor, after a series of 
questions about Det. Cutler's alleged experience in handwriting, 
see Tr. Trans., Vol. I. at 226, lines 6-21, asked him if "it 
would have been possible . . . for [him] to take [the 
Defendant's] handwritten statement and compare it to the 
handwriting [he] ha[s] on Exhibit 1, the check." Id. at lines 
22-25. Trial counsel objected. Id. at 227, lines 1-2. After a 
sidebar, trial counsel stated her ground: "Your honor, as I 
indicated, I object to this witness answering the question Mr. 
Jones posed to him because of lack of notice which is required by 
statute." Id. at lines 6-9. The trial court sustained her 
objection. See id. at lines 10-11. Although the trial court 
sustained trial counsel's objection, during closing argument, the 
prosecutor made reference and/or vouched for Det. Cutler as being 
a handwriting expert four times. Tr. Trans. Vol. II at 317, line 
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20; id. at 347, lines 23-25; id. at 348, lines 1-2, and lines 3-
7; id. at lines 17-18. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Defendant asserts that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient because she failed to object to the prosecutor 
eliciting testimony about Defendant's invocation of his Miranda 
right to counsel during his post-arrest interview with the 
investigating officers, failure to move the trial court for a new 
trial, failure to request an admonition and a curative 
instruction violated the Defendant's due process rights. These 
are areas which the prosecutor should not comment upon. And, by 
commenting thereon, the prosecutor violated the Defendant's due 
process rights. Moreover, trial counsel was deficient because 
she also elicited testimony from the Defendant about his 
constitutional Fifth Amendment right to counsel. This deficient 
performance by counsel also prejudiced because of the 
circumstances by which the prosecutor brought it out in court. 
Additionally, trial counsel should have also objected at the 
outset of the questioning of Det. Cutler, as that questioning 
related to the prosecutor's attempts to establish Det. Cutler as 
an expert witness in handwriting analysis. The prosecutor had 
failed to provide counsel with notice that he intended to use 
Det. Cutler as an alleged witness. Because there was no notice, 
then Det. Cutler should not have been asked any question relating 
to his alleged expertise in that area. Given there was no 
notice, and given that the trial court affirmed counsel's 
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objection, she should have objected during closing argument when 
the prosecutor made reference to Det. Cutler as an expert in 
handwriting analysis or objected because the prosecutor was 
vouching for Det. Cutler as an expert. This deficient 
performance prejudiced the Defendant because the prosecutor's 
comments effectively prevented the jury from performing their 
exclusive role, that is, properly assessing the evidence. 
Finally, the prosecutor made numerous comments to the jury 
that the Defendant had been incarcerated in June of 1997, just 
prior to trial. The jury was also with knowledge that the 
alleged crime occurred on October 2nd, 1996. The jury would 
infer he is a dangerous and bad person because he is still in 
jail eight and one-half months later. These comments by the 
prosecutor denied the Defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights because the Defendant's presumption of innocence 
was impaired. 
VI. ARGUMENTS 
I. WHETHER DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED 
A. Due process violation 
Defendant's first claim is that trial counsel was 
ineffective because she failed to object when the prosecutor 
elicited testimony that the Defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel, failed to move the trial court for a mistrial, 
failed to request the trial court to admonish the prosecutor to 
not question any witness about this fact, and trial counsel 
failed to request a curative instruction. 
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Trial counsel was also ineffective because on direct she 
also questioned the Defendant about the fact he invoked his right 
to counsel. Not only was this line of questioning improper, but 
it opened the door for the prosecutor on cross-examination to 
resume what he initiated, that is, call the jury's attention to 
the fact the Defendant invoked his Miranda right to counsel. 
1. Standard 
"The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused has the right 
to assistance of counsel in all criminal proceedings." Houchin 
v. Zavaris, 107 F.3d 1465, 1471 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. 
Const, amend VI). "[T]his right to assistance of counsel 
includes the right to effective assistance of counsel." Id. 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). 
"'The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result.'" State v. Holland, 
876 P.2 357, 362 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
686). "In considering claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Utah courts have consistently applied the test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 
[sic]." State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993) 
(internal quotations omitted; citations omitted). See State v. 
Arcruelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) ("In determining whether 
[sic] counsel was constitutionally ineffective, we apply the two-
prong test established in Strickland [sic]."). 
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"'In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, [the Defendant] must show that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it "fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness," and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the outcome of the trial.'" State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 
539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-
88) (citing State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) 
and State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993))). 
"When a defendant claims that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient, [appellate courts] must 'indulge in the strong 
presumption counsel's conduct falls within the wide range 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy."'" 
Garrett, 849 P.2d at 579 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) 
(quoting Michel v. Louisana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
"To show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland 
test, 'a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different."'" Arquelles, 921 
P.2d at 441 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 
1994), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. (1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694)). "A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict." State v. Alvarado, 845 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) . 
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Prior to evaluating the Strickland standard to the facts of 
this case, a procedural matter must first be evaluated. In Utah, 
"[g]enerally, an appellant cannot raise an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim for the first time on appeal because the trial 
record is insufficient to allow the claim to be determined." 
State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)). Accord 
Alvarado, 845 P.2d at 970/ State v. Schnoor, 845 P.2d 947, 950 
(Utah App. 1993) . "However, an appellant can raise such a claim 
if the trial record is adequate to permit determination of the 
issue and there is new counsel on appeal." Alvarado, 845 P.2d 
966 (citing Humphries. 818 P.2d at 1029 and State v. Johnson. 823 
P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991)). Accord: State v. Chacon, 962 
P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998); State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 
1996). "Judicial economy will be served thereby." Humphries. 
818 P.2d at 1029. 
The Defendant submits this Court can reach the merits of his 
Sixth Amendment claims because the trial record is adequate to 
permit determination of his claims, and he is represented by new 
counsel. Thus, remand pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) is 
unnecessary. See Chacon. 962 P.2d at 50 (Remand motion denied 
"because the record before [it] was adequate to evaluate the 
merits of the issues raised."). 
2. Deficient performance 
"Under Miranda, [sic] a defendant enjoys rights to counsel 
and to remain silent." United States v. Ross. 123 F.3d 1181, 
11 
1187 (9th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 733 (1998). "As a 
necessary corollary, the government is prohibited from using 
against a defendant his decision to exercise those rights." Id. 
(citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976)). Additionally, 
in State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that it "agree[s] with the proposition that when a 
person invokes his constitutional rights, the prosecution should 
not comment thereon, nor use it in any way that will tend to 
impair or destroy that privilege." Id. at 1328 (footnote and 
citations omitted). Further, in Freeman v. Class, 911 F. Supp. 
402 (D. S.D. 1995), the Court concluded that "[i]t would have 
been reversible error for the prosecutor, over objection of the 
defendant, to have commented on the defendant's exercise of his 
constitutional right to remain silent." Id. at 409 (citing 
United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588, 593 (10th Cir. 1969)). The 
Court also concluded that "[t]here was no reasonable tactical 
reason why defense counsel did not object to these comments." 
Id. The Court further stated that "[a] motion for a mistrial 
would also have been appropriate and should have been made. At a 
minimum, defense counsel should have requested an admonition from 
the trial court, instructing the jury to disregard such matters." 
See id. 
If the government is prohibited from using against a 
criminal defendant his decision to exercise his right to counsel, 
and given that the prosecutor should not comment thereon, it 
follows that trial counsel was deficient for not objecting when 
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the prosecutor elicited testimony about Defendant's invocation of 
his right to counsel. See, e.g., State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 
1205 (Utah 1984) ("[I]t was error for defense counsel not to 
object to the questions asked by the prosecutor [.]") . 
Additionally, if trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to 
the prosecutor's questions, she, too, was deficient for asking 
the same questions. See LajLrby, 699 P. 2d at 1205 (" [I]t was 
error for defense counsel . . . [herself] to ask questions on the 
subject.") (ellipsis inserted). 
Trial counsel was also deficient for not moving the trial 
court for a mistrial. See Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 409 ("A 
motion for mistrial would also have been appropriate and should 
have been made."). Counsel was ineffective because she should 
have also requested a curative instruction. See United States v. 
Daoud, 741 F.2d 478, 480 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[DJistrict court erred 
in refusing to grant a curative instruction. Defendant had a 
constitutional right not to be penalized for invoking her right 
to counsel[.]"). 
Given the foregoing, the Defendant asserts he has satisfied 
the first prong of the Strickland test inasmuch as trial 
counsel's representation was deficient in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. "No sound course of trial 
strategy could dictate defense counsel to be silent [.]" 
Humphries, 818 P.2d at 1030. The Defendant having satisfied the 
first prong of the Strickland test, must now show that trial 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the trial's outcome. 
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3. Whether the Defendant was prejudiced by counsel's 
deficient performance 
In Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 831 (1991), the "petitioner argue [d] that the 
rule of Doyle as extended in Greenfield [sic] was violated when 
the prosecutor elicited testimony at trial concerning [his] post-
arrest request for counsel." Id. at 201. With respect to the 
invocation of the petitioner's right to counsel, the Court noted 
that "Doyle and the cases applying the rule against using a 
defendant's post-arrest silence against him center the 
constitutional inquiry around the particular use to which the 
post-arrest silence is being put." Id. at 202. Specifically, 
the Court stated that it "must look at the circumstances in which 
a criminal defendant's post-arrest silence or request for counsel 
is revealed in court in order to determine whether the purposes 
underlying the rule in Doyle have been undermined." Id. See 
Daoud, 741 F.2d at 480 ("When the prosecution reveals at trial 
that a defendant asked for a lawyer after his arrest, courts have 
looked at all the circumstances under which the disclosure was 
made in order to determine how seriously in the eyes of the jury 
it may have penalized defendant's exercise of his right to 
counsel."). 
After being given his Miranda warning, the Defendant invoked 
his right to counsel. The first was his refusal to submit to a 
writing exemplar without counsel. See Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 225, 
lines 5-25; id. at 226, lines 1-4. He also had invoked it 
because he felt "they were turning it into some kind of crime [he 
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was] involved in, or something[.]" See Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 
260, lines 14-23, and id. at 261, lines 1-4. He also invoked his 
right to counsel because the investigating officers were not 
listening to him. Id. at 261, lines 2-4. 
The prosecutor first informed the jury of the fact the 
Defendant had invoked his right to counsel. See Tr. Trans., Vol. 
I at 225, lines 5-25; id. at 226, line 1-4. Then, trial counsel 
had the Defendant remark about it the next three times. Tr. 
Trans, Vol. II at 260, 17-23; id. at 261, lines 2-4. The 
prosecutor then again informed the jury of the fact the Defendant 
invoked his Miranda right to counsel. See Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 
284, lines 17-19; id. at 285, lines 14-16; see id. at lines 22-
24. 
As previously noted, it was the prosecutor who first 
informed the jury of the fact that the Defendant invoked his 
right to counsel during his post-arrest interview with Det. 
Cutler. Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 226, lines 3-4. The prosecutor 
exploited the fact because he knew that the Defendant's defense 
was essentially based upon the Defendant's contention that he did 
not write the alleged forged check, and that it was Mr. Novak who 
had written the check. There was not need for the prosecutor to 
have Det. Cutler mention that the Defendant had invoked his right 
to counsel. Det. Cutler could have simply informed the jury that 
the Defendant refused to provide a writing exemplar. 
On direct examination by trial counsel, the Defendant told 
the jury that the reason he wanted an attorney was because he 
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wanted counsel present when submitting a writing exemplar. Tr. 
Trans., Vol. I at 260, line 17-19. He also told the jury he 
wanted an attorney because "they were turning [the investigation] 
into some kind of crime [he was involved in] ." Id. at lines 21-
23. He also told the jury he invoked his right to counsel 
because the investigating officers were not listening to him. 
Id. at 261, lines 2-4. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor told the Defendant, 
"you refused to give Det. Cutler a handwriting sample, didn't 
you." Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 284, lines 17-18. The prosecutor 
again exploited the fact that Defendant requested counsel. He 
knew what the Defendant would say, and he did say, "Without a 
lawyer present." Id. at line 19. 
The prosecutor also told the Defendant, "But you admit that 
he asked you for a handwriting sample?" Id. at 7-8. The 
prosecutor then asked the Defendant essentially the same 
question. "Well, then, why didn't you give [him the handwriting 
sample], sir?" Id. at 285, line 14. The Defendant again 
responded that the reason was " [b]ecause [he] wanted a lawyer 
present because there was something strange about that." Id. at 
lines 15-16. In response, the prosecutor told the Defendant, 
"Something strange about trying to prove your innocence?" Id. at 
lines 17-18. This comment by the prosecutor is yet another clear 
exploitation. He is striking at the heart of the Defendant's 
exculpatory story. 
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The prosecutor again asked the Defendant, "So instead of 
giving him the sample and letting him solve the case --" Id. at 
lines 22-23. The Defendant again told the prosecutor he had 
invoked his right to counsel, "Without a lawyer present. It's my 
right." See id. at line 24. The prosecutor responded, "You 
thought he was going to trick you or something like that." Id. 
at line 25; see id at 286, line 1. 
The foregoing examples show that the Defendant's due process 
rights, as delineated in Doyle and extended in Wainwright were 
violated. This is because the prosecutor exploited Defendant's 
exercise of his Miranda right to counsel. As such, Defendant's 
convictions should be reversed. Given they should be reversed, 
it logically follows that the Defendant was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's deficient performance. 
B. Counsel was ineffective for failing to object at the 
outset of the State's attempts to establish Det. Cutler as 
a handwriting expert and because she failed to object during 
closing argument about the prosecutor saying Det. Cutler was 
an expert 
1. Deficient performance 
Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because 
she failed to object at the outset of the prosecutor's attempt to 
qualify Det. Cutler as an expert, failed to object during closing 
argument to the prosecutor's references to Det. Cutler as being a 
handwriting expert, and failed to object to the prosecutor 
vouching for Det. Cutler as a handwriting expert. 
The issue here, as in United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276 
(D.C. Cir. 1996), was "whether the prosecutor's errors in . . . 
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closing argument, by referring to matters that were never 
introduced into evidence at trial, denied [Defendant] a fair 
trial by causing undue prejudice or by preventing the jury from 
properly assessing the evidence." Id. at 1281 (citing Frazier v. 
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 735-36 (1969)). 
During the prosecutor's examination of Det. Cutler, he asked 
Det. Cutler whether he has "any expertise in handwriting?" Tr. 
Trans., Vol. I at 226, line 7. Det. Cutler said he did, and that 
he has testified in District Court on handwriting six times. Id. 
at lines 8-9. The prosecutor then inquired as to whether Det. 
Cutler went "through courses or classes in handwriting [.]" Id. 
at lines 10-11. Det. Cutler said he has, and that he went to "a 
13 week course on document examination, been a part of an 
organization that gives training about once a month[,] talked to 
the State Crime Lab expert numerous times on cases [,] handled 
hundreds of cases involving handwriting[, and] continue [s] to 
find out whatever [he] can to try to improve the situation [.]" 
Id. at lines 12-18. The prosecutor again directed the jury's 
attention to Det. Cutler's alleged experience: "You say you've 
testified in court as an expert on handwriting?" Id. at lines 
19-20. Det. Cutler said, "Yes. Six times so far." Id. at line 
21. 
Relating the foregoing qualifications to the Defendant's 
case, the prosecutor then asked Det. Cutler whether "it have been 
possible . . . for [him] to take [the Defendant's] handwritten 
statement and compare it to the handwriting [he] ha[s] on Exhibit 
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1, the check." Id. at lines 22-25. Trial counsel objected, id. 
at 227, lines 1-2, a sidebar followed, id. at 3-5, and then in 
open court, trial counsel stated her ground for the objection, 
which was that she objected to Det. Cutler answering the question 
"because of lack of notice which is required by statute." Id. at 
lines 6-9. The trial court sustained trial counsel's objection. 
See id. at lines 10-11. 
Trial counsel was deficient for not objecting at the outset 
of the prosecutor's first question. When the prosecutor first 
asked Det. Cutler whether he has "any expertise in handwriting," 
trial counsel knew that the prosecutor was attempting to qualify 
him as an expert. An objection should have been made at this 
point because by not objecting trial counsel permitted the 
prosecutor to lay all the foundation the jury needed to accept 
Det. Cutler as a handwriting expert. An objection would have 
been sustained on the same ground, lack of notice. 
Similarly, trial counsel was deficient for not objecting 
during closing when the prosecutor referred and/or vouched for 
Det. Cutler as being a expert in handwriting analysis. Trial 
counsel's objection would have been sustained on the same ground, 
lack of notice. Having satisfied the first prong, the Defendant 
now turns to the second Strickland factor. 
2. Prejudice to the Defendant 
Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
Defendant because her failure to object at the outset permitted 
the jury to hear about Det. Cutler's alleged experience in 
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handwriting analysis, which, in turn, permitted the jurors to 
infer that they could rely on his experience because he is an 
expert. Statutory notice became meaningless because of trial 
counsel's failure to object. 
The Defendant was also prejudiced because of trial counsel's 
inactivity during closing. During closing argument, the 
prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel "suggested to you 
to take a minute and compare, if you want, some of the 
handwriting on the check and compare it to the defendant's 
statement. And, you know, while that's true and you certainly 
have an opportunity to do that, I would suggest to you that you 
should be very careful about falling into that trap, if you 
will." Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 347, lines 16-22. The prosecutor 
also told the jury that " [i]f it were that easy, if we could just 
say, 'take a look at this and tell me what you think,' we 
wouldn't need to have handwriting experts. We wouldn't need to 
have people like Det. Cutler, who went to school, I think, for 13 
or 14 weeks to become an expert. Id. at 347, lines 23-25 and p. 
348 1-2. Trial counsel should have objected because it had not 
been established and the trial court had not accepted Det. Cutler 
as an expert in handwriting analysis. 
The prosecutor next told the jury, "Because this is one of 
the areas in police investigation that really requires an expert. 
It requires somebody who has the trained eye and who knows what 
to look for when trying to make comparisons between the check and 
a known sample of the defendant's handwriting." Id. at 348, 
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lines 2-7. The prosecutor went on to tell the jury, "I submit 
that it's much harder than it looks. And while you certainly can 
spend your time looking at different letters and numbers and 
everything, I'd just caution you, I'd be a little careful, I'd be 
a little skeptical about trying to reach any conclusions. 
Because if you remember right, Det. Cutler said to the defendant, 
'I need a sample of you handwriting.'" Id. at lines 8-14. The 
prosecutor further told the jury that Det. Cutler "wanted a 
sample of the defendant's handwriting in order for him to reach a 
conclusion. And if Det. Cutler, who is trained in handwriting 
can't give us an opinion in this courtroom about the handwriting, 
I think it's a little difficult for us, without having any 
special training, to do that." See id. at lines 15-20. 
The prosecutor's closing arguments wherein he referred 
and/or vouched for Det. Cutler as being an expert in the field of 
handwriting analysis effectively "prevented the jury from 
properly assessing the evidence." Small, 74 F.3d 1281 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (citing Frazier, 394 U.S. at 735-36). It is reasonable for 
the jury to infer that there was no need for them to attempt to 
determine whether the handwriting on the check and the 
Defendant's handwriting writing matched because an "expert" such 
as Det. Cutler, with all of his experience, could not. The 
prosecutor's actions, and trial counsel's inactions prevented the 
Defendant from receiving a fair trial. Accordingly, Defendant's 
convictions should be reversed. 
/ / / \ \ \ 
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II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL ON THE GROUND 
THAT THE PROSECUTOR INJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
CHARACTER INTO EVIDENCE 
"[T]he prosecution may not introduce evidence of an accused 
character unless the accused himself raises the issue." State v. 
Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted). Here, 
the Defendant did not raise the issue. Moreover, there was a 
pre-trial order in effect which prohibited the prosecutor from 
introducing the Defendant's character into evidence. See Tr. 
Trans., Vol. II at 301, lines 22-35. 
However, despite the Court's Order, and case law prohibiting 
the prosecutor from compromising the Defendant's presumption of 
innocence, the prosecutor repeatedly focused the jury's attention 
to the fact the Defendant was incarcerated in June of 1998, just 
slightly before trial. Specifically, the prosecutor told the 
Defendant, "And you were there with him, weren't you?" Tr. Vol. 
II at 268, line 19. Clarifying his question, the prosector told 
the Defendant, "[S] ir, is it your testimony you were not in jail 
in late June of this year?" Id. at lines 21-23. Clarifying his 
question again, the prosecutor told the Defendant, "No, sir, 
that's not my question. I didn't ask if you were in the same 
cell. I asked you if it's true both of you were in jail in late 
June of this year." Id. at 269, lines 4-6. The prosecutor 
further told the Defendant, "You were in jail and so was he." 
See id. at line 17. 
The Defendant submits that the prosecutor's line of 
questioning denied the Defendant his Fourteenth Amendment due 
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process right to a fair trial because the Defendant's presumption 
of innocence was impaired by the prosecutor's line of 
questioning. And, the trial court erred in not recognizing that 
the Defendant's constitutional rights were violated by the 
prosecutor's line of questioning. 
There are "two dangers flowing from the jury's knowledge of 
the defendant's incarceration: (i) it brands the defendant 'in 
the eyes of the jurors with an unmistakable mark of guilt' and 
(ii) pre-trial incarceration, in particular, while often the 
result of nothing more than an inability to raise bail, may lead 
the jury to speculate that the defendant is particularly 
dangerous." United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051, 
1058 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Harris, 703 
F.2d 508, 510 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 
U.S. 501, 518-19 (1976) )) . 
In the case at bar, the first danger compromised the 
Defendant's presumption of innocence because he was branded "with 
an unmistakable mark of guilt." The second danger is 
significantly present. The jury knew that the alleged crime 
occurred on October 2nd, 1996, and that the Defendant was 
arrested on that day. Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 253, lines 18-24. 
The jury's inference would necessarily be, why is the Defendant 
still in jail in June of 1997, over eight months after the 
alleged incident, if he is not a dangerous and bad person? 
Because the prosecutor injected the Defendant's character into 
evidence, the Defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
23 
to a fair trial was breached and, accordingly, the Defendant 
should be entitled to a new trial. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing violations of the Defendant's 
constitutional rights, Defendant's convictions should be 
reversed. 
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